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Introduction
Broadly speaking, we refer to quantitative information flow (qif) as the measurement of the quantity of information flowing from a unobservable random variable X to an observable Y . When expressing information as Shannon entropy [14] , this quantity is just mutual information, that is, the difference between the prior and conditional entropy of X .
Computer scientists and statisticians have considered qif from different perspectives. In the context of computer security, qif measures expected leaks in a probabilistic system, revealing part of the secret X after some Y is observed. For a statistician, qif corresponds to the expected reduction in uncertainty as the reward for an observation. Attackers, experimental designers and defenders are just few of the very different names assumed by the actors playing in this scene. Here, we take a somewhat neutral perspective, and simply refer to the analyst as someone who can expect a net gain from conditioning X on Y , in a scenario involving a cost proportional to the size of the set of possible guesses, and a reward associated with learning the secret.
In the field of quantitative security, Smith [30] has recently considered the problem of providing an adequate qif measure for a scenario where an analyst is limited to a single guess on the candidates for the secret. An atm withdrawing a credit card after two failed attempts at guessing the pin illustrates the case. In this context, mutual information, which considers the global uncertainty about X before and after observing Y under a − log scale, was found to be inadequate as a measure of a qif: in fact, the analyst's guess is now just the mode of X , so his concern is only about V (X) = max x p(x) and V (X|Y ) = E y [max x p(x| y)], named vulnerability and conditional vulnerability of the system, respectively. Mimicking Shannon entropy, Smith used vulnerability on the − log scale, thus obtaining an instance of Renyi's entropy called min-entropy. In the present paper, we follow a more general approach to qif, stemming from the tradition of Bayesian decision theory, as for example expounded in [18] . The idea is to introduce, for the problem at hand, costs associated with possible actions and a reward for learning a secret; then to derive the optimal analyst's action, that is, the one maximizing the overall expected gain. An action is just a set of possibilities that the analyst should test, or somehow further, in order to (hopefully) learn the secret, given some observable evidence. Min-entropy corresponds to the case where the reward and the costs are fixed in such a way that there is no advantage to go on testing beyond the first, most likely possibility.
In the paper, we first define a general setting from which a gain function and a qif measure are derived (Section 2).
A central role is played by advantage, denoted A( X; Y ): the difference in expected gain before and after the observation, if the analyst plays an optimal action. This represents the value, for the analyst, of the information that Y conveys about X .
We then specialize the analysis by considering a fixed reward α coming from learning the secret and a unit cost for each undertaken attempt (Section 3). In this setting, we derive the optimal behavior for the analyst and characterize the resulting advantage. The behavior is shown to be more effective than both a k-tries approach with a fixed k, and the behavior based on trying guesses up to reaching a fixed probability coverage. Our results are then specialized to the important case of a non-informative (uniform) prior on the secrets, possibly in the presence of a symmetric or deterministic system (Section 4).
In particular, when the reward coming from the secret equals precisely the cost of learning the secret for sure, we establish that the optimal analyst's behavior essentially corresponds to the one derived from the likelihood ratio criterion. We also consider the maximum advantage that can be obtained over all prior distributions, which is important in security contexts, that is capacity. We characterize capacity almost completely in the case of deterministic channels. We then examine a few applications of the proposed framework, concerning cryptographic systems and the analysis of forensic databases for familial DNA searching (Section 5). Discussion of further and related work concludes the paper (Section 6). Some detailed proofs have been confined to a separate appendix.
Setup
We let X and Y be finite, nonempty sets of secrets and observables, respectively. A conditional probability matrix p Y |X ∈ [0, 1] X ×Y defines the behavior of the system under observation, with p( y|x) denoting the probability of the observation y when the secret is x. In the terminology of Information Theory, p Y |X represents the channel through which information about the secret flows. A prior probability p X on X is assumed; we will drop the index X whenever X is clear from the context. p X and the channel matrix p Y |X together give rise to a joint probability distribution on X × Y, hence to a pair (X, Y ) of input-output random variables, as expected. In many specific contexts, X and Y are not immediately related to one another, but we assume it is possible for the analyst to marginalize out all the unobserved r.v.'s in the system, apart from X . Therefore, both the prior and the conditional probability matrices are assumed to be known to the analyst. We will make freely use of such notational shorthand as p( y) for Pr(Y = y), p(x| y) for Pr( X = x|Y = y), and so on, whenever no ambiguity arises as to the underlying random variables and distributions.
Let W be a finite, nonempty set of actions the analyst can take, possibly after observing Y . Undertaking a certain action under a given state of the world/secret induces a (possibly negative) gain for the analyst, according to a given gain function g : X × W → R. The expected gain under p X and w ∈ W and the maximal expected gain under p X are defined respectively as follows: For y ∈ Y, let p(·| y) denote the posterior probability distribution on X given Y = y, whenever such an event has nonzero probability, and by G( X| y) = G(p(·| y)) the corresponding gain. The posterior maximal expected gain, advantage (under p X ) and capacity of the system are given by:
where in (3) it is understood that the sum runs over y's of positive probability. General and somewhat standard results about expected gain and advantage are the following. For the sake of completeness, we report their proofs in Appendix A.
We let P be the set of probability distributions on X , seen as a subset of R |X | . 
Lemma 1 (Convexity). G(p), as a function of p, is convex over P.
Applying the above lemma and Jensen's inequality, we get the following corollary. It says that for the analyst it is always advantageous, on average, to try and guess after observing Y rather than before. This is a standard result first published by Raiffa and Schlaifer [27] but also noted by Ramsey in the 1920s. 
General results on rational analysts
We now instantiate the setup of the previous section to one where an analyst can investigate a set of candidates for the secret, with a cost proportional to the size of the set. Moreover, the analyst assigns the secret a certain value α > 0: this represents the maximal amount of resources the analyst is willing to spend to learn the secret. For notational simplicity, we stipulate that the value of the secret is expressed in cost units -that is, the secret is worth α times the cost of trying a single candidate. This leads to the following definitions.
where 2 X denotes the powerset of X , 1 E is the indicator function of E, which holds 1 if E is true and 0 otherwise, and | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. Let us emphasize that, as apparent from (7), the analyst's cost is only associated with the action of trying the set of possible guesses, w. Differently from other models considered in the literature (see Section 6), here there is no cost associated with the observation itself. This is sensible in all concrete situations where the observation cost is negligible when compared to the guess-trying cost: think of message interception in a cryptographic system or anonymity protocol like Crowds [28] ; or of DNA extraction, whose cost is negligible with respect to checking a correspondence with the crime sample in each investigated family (see Section 5) . Remark 1 contains further examples of this situation.
We begin with characterizing the optimal behavior of the analyst given a generic prior p X , that is, the Bayes action corresponding to p X in the above framework. Let us define the following set w * = {x : p(x) ≥ 1/α} . (8) For any w ⊆ X , we let p(w) denote x∈w p(x).
Proof. Consider any w ⊆ X . We have the following:
where: inequality (9) [22] , see related work in Section 6). For another example, consider a scenario where, due to investigative reasons, all suspects prompted by the DNA traits extracted from a crime scene must be tried in a very short time, hence essentially in parallel.
Remark 2 (Bayes action vs. alternative actions).
The k-tries approach, for fixed k, considered by Smith (see e.g. [30] for the case k = 1 and, more generally, [21] ) and the coverage model by Slooten and Meester [29] , are in general sub-optimal if a cost structure is considered. In both cases, in fact, if more than |w * | guesses are investigated, the net reward for the additional k − |w * | investigated guesses, is negative. On the other hand, if less than |w * | guesses are considered, the missed |w * | − k ones would achieve a net positive gain. We note that, under the assumption that p X is known, it is possible to recover the 1-try approach in our model by fixing any α such that 1/π M < α ≤ 1/π M , where π M and π M denote the largest and second largest probability values in p X , respectively.
The above lemma specializes to the following characterization when p X is uniform. We let N = |X |.
Corollary 2.
Let p X be uniform on X . Then the following three cases may arise depending on α: For the analyst it is important to estimate the advantage gained by observing Y , over not observing it: this quantifies the value of the information conveyed by Y to him. We study this aspect in the rest of the section. Our first result is a simple remark, saying that the advantage can be decomposed into two parts: one depends on how much the probability mass in the Bayes action gets incremented after the observation; the other on how much the Bayes action shrinks after the observation. A proof is reported in Appendix A. In the sequel, for any y such that p( y) > 0, we let w * y be the Bayes action associated with the posterior probability distribution p(·| y). Explicitly,
Remark 3.
Note that, for a fixed prior p X , the maximum of A( X; Y ) taken over all possible channels is achieved if the posterior on the possible secrets degenerates into a point mass function, for every y. Thus, the maximal achievable advan-
. Likewise, the maximum advantage, hence capacity, for a given channel cannot exceed α − 1. Proof. By definition
Our last result in this section is a simple formula to estimate G( X|Y ). By this, we mean a formula based solely on quantities depending on the system p Y |X , plus knowledge of the minimal and maximal probability values in the prior. This characterization is useful because it allows for an estimation of G( X|Y ) based on very little knowledge about the prior.
From a Bayesian point of view, this corresponds to an intermediate position, in between full knowledge of the prior and non-informativeness. The formula allows for the derivation of results on advantage in a uniform fashion, in a number of special but important instances of the framework that will be considered in the next section.
We define below a few quantities and sets, also depending on given y ∈ Y, with the following intuitive meaning. π M and π m are the largest and smallest nonzero probability values of the prior, while S y is the sum of the entries in the y-column of the conditional probability matrix. w + y , w − y represent certain over-and under-approximation of the Bayes action after observing y. They are obtained by weakening (resp. strengthening) the condition p(x| y) ≥ 1/α as follows. First, focusing on the conditional probability matrix, we note that this condition can be written as
y are the column sums restricted to those rows which enter the over-and under-approximation, respectively, of the Bayes action after y. Formally, we have
The following result gives upper-and lower-bounds for G( X|Y ) based on the above quantities, for an arbitrary prior distribution p X of full support. The proof is reported in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. Assume p X has full support. Then y απ mŜ
− y − π M S y |w + y | ≤ G( X|Y ) ≤ y απ MŜ + y − π m S y |w − y | .
Special cases
We will examine three instances of the general model that are practically important, and for which we can prove more convenient characterization of advantage.
Uniform prior
In case the prior p X is uniform, we have π m = π M = 1/N in Proposition 3. Note that, in this case, the Bayes action for the adversary after observing y ∈ Y can be written as
As a consequence, the (·) + and (·) − sets/quantities defined in the previous section coincide, and we can drop the superscripts from them. The upper and lower bounds given in Proposition 3 coincide too. As a consequence, we have the following characterization of advantage for uniform prior. For convenience we let S * = yŜ y denote the sum of the entries of the channel matrix that are not less than the threshold S y /α. The result shows that advantage is proportional to S * .
Corollary 3 (Uniform prior)
. Let p X be uniform. Remark 5 (α = N and the LR criterion). The case α = N has a special meaning, since it illustrates a system that is, so to speak, in equilibrium: the cost of learning the secret with certainty (investigating all the possibilities) equals the revenue coming from learning the secret. It is interesting to look at the form of the Bayes actions in this case. Note that with p X uniform and α = N, we have that the condition p(x| y) ≥ 1/α is equivalent to p( y|x) ≥ p( y). Although the first formulation is more intuitive, we prefer to work here with the second one, which mentions likelihoods, in order to establish a bridge with the LR criterion. Hence we express the posterior Bayes action as
That is, the set w * y includes exactly those guesses x such that the likelihood of y under x is at least as big as the average likelihood of y.
Another interesting remark is that, for large N, the inclusion of a guess in the set w * y coincides with a decision based solely on the classical likelihood ratio (LR) criterion. To see this, consider any observation y of positive probability and any guess x. According to the LR criterion, guess x receives support by y if LR(x; y) ≥ 1, that is, if
By (12), x is in w * y if and only if
We see that, for N large enough, the two criteria coincide, that is LR(x; y) ≥ 1 iff x ∈ w * y .
Special channels
An interesting special case is when the conditional probability matrix has columns that are pairwise identical up to a permutation, like for example in the case of a communication protocol (e.g. Crowds). Then |w * y | does not depend on y, and we let |w * y | = c * , for each y. We also make use of the fact that, in general, y S y = N. We can therefore arrive at a simplification.
Corollary 4 (Uniform prior and column-symmetric system). Let p X be uniform and assume p Y |X has columns that are pairwise identical up to a permutation.
•
Another interesting special case is when the conditional probability matrix defines a deterministic function f : X → Y: that is, p( y|x) = 1 if and only if f (x) = y. Let c 1 , . . . , c K , be the equivalence classes of X determined by f , that is, the nonempty inverse images
Corollary 5 (Uniform prior and deterministic system). Let p X be uniform and assume p Y |X is deterministic.
Proof. Let us examine the first part. Under the stated assumptions, it is immediate to check that, for each y of positive probability, letting c = f −1 (y), we have: w * y = c and S y =Ŝ y = |w y | = |c|. From Corollary 3, the wanted result follows by summing over all y and using some algebra. The second part is similar: note however that, for a given y, the Bayes action is w *
Capacity of deterministic channels
Evaluating capacity is especially important in a security scenario: before deploying a system, a designer may be interested in providing a formal bound to the maximal advantage an attacker could get from the system's observation. This bound should hold irrespective of the probability distribution over the possible secrets, which may be user-specific and not known in advance.
In the deterministic case, we are able to provide an almost complete characterization of capacity, and describe distributions that achieve it. Below, following the notation introduced in the previous subsection, we let c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c K denote the classes determined by the function f , ordered by decreasing cardinality, and corresponding to the observables y 1 , . . . , y K , respectively. To avoid trivialities, we will assume that α ≥ 1. The proof of the following proposition is based on a somewhat elaborated case analysis, which is reported in Appendix A. We discuss the significance of the results after Corollary 6, which provides a less tight but handier bound for capacity.
Proposition 4.
Assume p Y |X is deterministic and denote by C its capacity. 
Proof. By the previous proposition, part 2, and taking into account that 1 − N/α ≥ 0, we obtain that
, and apply Jensen's inequality to the (convex) squaring function, to obtain:
The case α ≤ K is the simplest: under the given prior, the value attached to the secret is too small for an analyst to undertake any action before the observation; moreover the observation plainly reveals the secret. The case α ≥ N is best understood by looking at the upper bound in Corollary 6 and letting α = N. The resulting bound N(1 − 1/K ) says that advantage increases as the number of equivalence classes K grows, approaching the ideal value N − 1 as K approaches N.
In any case, no matter the value of α, the advantage cannot be greater than N: in fact, it approaches N as α approaches infinity. Note that, in general, the distribution achieving capacity is not uniform, but approaches the uniform one as α approaches N from above.
The case K < α < N is not covered by our results. We conjecture that an analysis similar to the case α ≥ N could show that
i /α, with the integers n i 's summing to α (for α integer) and 0 ≤ n i ≤ |c i |. Such n i 's should be determined by solving an integer quadratic optimization problem. A formal proof of this fact escapes us at the moment.
Applications
We will consider three applications of our model: an anonymity protocol, symmetric cryptographic schemes and DNA identification.
The Crowds anonymity protocol
In the Crowds anonymity protocol [28] , a set of honest users 1, . . . , N want to exchange messages among one another, but each user wants to hide his identity as a sender from an eavesdropper (attacker). A message initiating from user i is collaboratively and randomly routed through the nodes of a clique network, until it reaches its intended destination. The network's nodes comprise all honest users, plus a number of corrupted nodes who collude with the attacker: if any corrupted node receives a message from honest user j, user j is said to have been detected. The attacker's task is to identify the user who is the true initiator of the message. Of course, the attacker cannot tell for sure if a detected user j is the true originator of the message or a just a forwarder. This gives rise to a system where X = Y = {1, . . . , N} and p( j|i) is the probability of detecting honest user j, given that honest user i is the true initiator and that some user is detected. The resulting matrix has a symmetric form:
where the values of β and γ depend on various parameters of the protocol, including: the size of the network, the proportion of corrupted nodes over honest ones, and the forwarding probability. The latter is the probability that, upon receiving a message, a honest user forwards it to a randomly chosen node, rather than sending it to its intended recipient. See [28, 11] for details. In any case, it holds that β > γ : the probability that the true initiator is detected is (usually, just slightly) higher than that of any other honest user. Assume now that the prior p X on honest users is uniform, and that α < N: according to Corollary 2, the best course of action for the adversary, if he cannot observe anything, is just doing nothing, which is realistic in practice. In this case, the advantage of observing the system coincides with the maximal expected gain. We are in the situation of Corollary 4, second item. Application of this result requires knowledge of the values of c * and S * , which we compute below. We distinguish two possible cases:
• β < 1/α. In this case, we have w * j = ∅ for each j, so c * = 0, S * = 0, so that A( X; Y ) = 0, by Corollary 4, second item.
In practice, the value of learning the secret is too small compared to the effort needed to guess the secret, even after observing the system.
• β ≥ 1/α. We have w * j = { j} for each j, since, under the given assumptions, γ < 1/N < 1/α. As a consequence, c * = 1, S * = Nβ, so that A( X; Y ) = αβ − 1, again by Corollary 4, second item. The final benefit for the adversary from learning the secret after observing the system is a fraction β of the secret's value α. We can make the system less attractive for the attackers by lowering β.
Cryptosystems
This example is inspired by Shannon's classical information-theoretic treatment of cryptography, as later extended by Hellman [20] . Assume a cryptosystem consists of P possible meaningful plaintext messages, L possible keys and C possible ciphertexts. For any fixed key, enciphering a plaintext results in a unique ciphertext: encryption is deterministic and injective once a key is fixed. For any ciphertext c, consider the set Z (c) of all the plaintext-key pairs (m, k) that give rise to c. By injectivity of encryption, any key appears at most once in Z (c), so |Z (c)| is precisely the number of possible keys that might have been used to generate c, hence a measure of the uncertainty of an attacker about the actual key, given c. Alternatively, |Z (c)| is the cost for an attacker of discovering the secret key, once c is observed. In practice, each candidate key can be tried on another ciphertext c relative to the same key, to see if it decrypts correctly.
We want to quantify the value for an (ideal) attacker of observing a ciphertext and find a simple lower bound for it.
Let then X be the set of possible meaningful plaintext-key pairs and Y be the set of possible ciphertexts. Consider the deterministic channel corresponding to the function f : X → Y such that f (m, k) = c if and only if enciphering m with k results in c. Further assume a uniform prior is given on X . This is assumption is realistic in certain situations: for example, when plaintexts are sentences of a given length in a given language, and the key is chosen uniformly at random and independently from the plaintext (see below). Assume, realistically, a reward α such that for each c
Note that the above condition implies that for each ciphertext c, w * c = Z (c). In an ideal cryptosystem, |Z (c)| should not vary much depending on c: so let us first assume for simplicity that |Z (c)| = |Z | is a constant not depending on c. We first check that
Then after some algebra we can prove obtain
Let us now drop the assumption that |Z (c)| is constant. We apply the second item of Corollary 5, and noting that here N = PL and |c|≤N |c| = N (the size of all classes is by assumption at most N), we obtain
Applying Jensen's inequality to the convex function x 2 , we obtain a simple lower bound on the summation in the above
which when plugged into (16) yields an upper bound for the attacker's advantage similar to the constant case (15)
As an example, assume that blocks of length n, taken from a given source language using an alphabet of t symbols, are enciphered using keys of m bits. If n is large enough and the source language has entropy per letter H , there will be (approximately) 2 nH blocks that are legitimate sentences in the language, and they will be (approximately) equiprobable 1 :
the set of these blocks will constitute our set of plaintexts. Hence, there are 2 nH possible plaintexts, t n = 2 n log t possible ciphertexts and 2 m possible keys. Therefore (17) becomes
To make a concrete case, assuming that the des cipher, featuring keys of m = 56 bits, is employed to encipher sentences in English, with t = 26 and H = 1.5, we may set: A( X; Y ) ≈ α − 2 −n3.2+56 . We see that the cost decreases exponentially as the block length n grows, and already with blocks of length around n = 18 letters, it is less than 1, meaning that there is nearly no uncertainty as to the key, for the attacker.
In reality, a concrete attacker, with limited computational resources, may not be able to determine Z (c) for each c, so this analysis can be considered overly pessimistic from a security point of view.
Familial searching through a forensic DNA database
In several countries a database of familial DNA traits is maintained to give an answer to families looking for a missing relative. The hope is to identify a body occasionally recovered as one of the claimed missing persons. Each family provides the investigators with the DNA traits of some of their members, together with the familial relations (the pedigree) linking the donors with the missing person. For each considered DNA trait, the first task of the investigators consists in deriving the conditional probability distribution of the trait for the missing relative, given the traits of the relatives. This becomes the main ingredient to evaluate the probability that the body under examination is the missing person claimed by that family. This process is referred to as familial searching by Evett and Weir [17] . In a different context, the DNA traits of an unknown crime perpetrator, somehow recovered, are compared with the DNA traits of several contributors stored in a data base, in an attempt to establish a relation between the perpetrator and the contributors or one of their relatives.
The DNA is typed on a number of loci, usually located on different chromosomes to exploit independence. At each locus, a genotype, an pair of alleles, coming from the paternal and maternal lineage, can be observed. The whole set of alleles pairs of an individual, for the considered loci, are the profile of the individual. The transmission of the alleles along generations is ruled by known mechanisms: the first Mendelian law is the simplest possible model. Alleles' probability is almost always estimated by relative frequencies from a sample of the population. Genotypes probabilities for a generic member of the population are derived by population models, via alleles' probability and other parameters tightly related to the specific model. The simplest population model is derived by the Hardy Weinberg conditions and follows a multinomial distribution [19] . We need not examine these models in detail here.
We formally model the problem of familial searching as follows. The secret random variable X corresponds to n specific identification hypotheses related to the contributors/families, plus the possibility that the perpetrator/corpse is related to the rest of the population: so X = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∪ {Rest}. We assume the reference population has size N > n, typically with N n. Since other identification clues are rarely available, it seems sensible to fix the following distribution, giving the prior probability that a perpetrator/recovered body is related to either any of the donors or to the rest of the population:
We let Y be the set of possible DNA profiles for the perpetrator/recovered body: these might be relative to one locus, or to multiple loci. Finally, we let p( y|x) denote the probability of observing the profile y, given that the perpetrator/body is actually linked to x. We just note that, once a pedigree relation between the contributor(s) and the perpetrator/corpse is assumed, p( y|x), for each x and y, is uniquely determined by the chosen transmission and population models (see also Remark 7). Application of the set up introduced in the previous sections to the present situation requires a small tweak. Indeed, the element Rest must be filtered out from the set of possible actions, as it makes little sense to investigate the rest of the population as a whole. So the set of actions is now W = 2 X \{Rest} . Letting S y denote the sum of the elements in the column y of the channel matrix restricted to rows x = Rest, we have therefore that the Bayes action after observing y can be expressed as , is pretty small, circumventing the illusion to have found interesting clues. Assuming, as it is reasonable, that α ≤ N, and denoting as we did before by S * = y,x∈w * y p( y|x) the sum of all the matrix entries that are at least as big as S y /α, advantage takes a simple form
This expression can be taken to represent the value of the information contained in the database.
Remark 6.
Given the genetic trait y found on a corpse, an interesting question, already posed by [29] in the case of a fixed coverage approach, is if the probability the body is related to a contributor in w * y is greater than the probability it is not. If this condition happens to be true, it encourages further identification activities. We start by noting that
since the probabilities above have the same normalization constant, the condition p(w * y |y) > p(Rest| y) happens to be true
As expected, if n approaches N, the condition becomes easier to be verified. On the other hand, this suggests, once again, to be very cautious when the number of the claimed missing person is a small fraction of the total.
Remark 7 (Computational issues).
Entries in the channel matrix are provided row by row, as the conditional probability of observing each possibly different DNA characteristics conditionally to each familial information. Paper and pencil calculation is possible but is time consuming and error prone. A commercial algebraical software, Dna-View [10] , provides single entries of the channel matrix. Alternatively, the entire distribution can be obtained numerically by freely available numerical software dedicated to the problem, such as Open Familias [16] . In both cases, the choice of the population models and transmission mechanism are limited by the specific software implementations. More freedom can be achieved programming the desired distributions by using a low level language or, as we did, through freely available Bayesian network routines [26] . If the transmission mechanism and the population model realistically take into account mutations, population substructure and a level of inbreeding, entries in each row of the matrix take on different values, and no equivalence classes arise. A notable exception occurs if there is only one familial donor in the direct lineage with the missing person, and the first Mendelian law is adopted (no mutations). In this case it can be shown that, irrespectively of the different number of genotypes in a locus, depending on the number of alleles, only six equivalence classes arise [13] : this typically favors sparse channel matrices and speeds up computations.
Conclusion and related work
We have put forward a framework for the analysis of qif inspired by the Bayesian utility theory. Approaches, proposed elsewhere in the literature, based on the examination of a fixed number of guesses or on a fixed coverage of the probability, are suboptimal. Applications to cryptographic schemes and to DNA searching have been considered.
Our analysis is confined to the realm of finite spaces, since applications we are mainly interested in fall in this category. An extension to secrets and observables defined on reals would deal with the predictive distribution of X before and after the observation of Y , having marginalized out all the nuisance parameters in the model linking them. Bayes actions w * would resemble highest posterior density (hpd) intervals, but our proposal, driven by cost and reward functions, does not rely on a fixed coverage probability. For simple models like linear regression, based on the joint multivariate normal, the predictive distribution is available in closed form, in others it can be simulated. This topic will be explored in a forthcoming paper. A preliminary investigation has revealed that the interesting property in Proposition 1 is retained: advantage depends on both the variation in probability and interval length of the predicted secret.
In computer security, there is a growing body of literature on qif. The basic principles have been laid out during the 2000's, see e.g. [12, 11, 3, 30, 4, 5, 21] and references therein. In the last few years, various extensions of the basic model have been considered: to mention but a few, [6] considers the case of one-try (min-entropy) attacks under repeated observations, while the worst-vs. average-case dimension is examined in [9] . Especially relevant to the present paper is the issue of partial secret disclosure [7] and, more generally, of leakage characterization in terms of adversary's (generic) gain, or g-leakage [1] . In the last paper, for a generic gain function g, Alvim et al. term the adversary's expected gain as g-vulnerability, and define g-leakage by comparing prior and posterior vulnerabilities multiplicatively -that is by taking their log-ratio, rather than their difference as we do here. Our expected gain G( X) might hence be seen as a g-vulnerability. Of course, both our definition and that of [1] are instances of Bayes risk in the sense of Bayesian decision theory, but the concerns are rather different. Indeed, [1] establishes general properties of g-leakage, mainly bounds between min-capacity, g-capacity, and Shannon capacity. On the other hand, the present paper focuses on a specific reward-cost model, for which meaningful results can be given that do not hold for g-leakage in general, nor for min-entropy leakage and its variants in particular.
In this paper, we have not considered sequential search, in which the analyst can choose his next action based on the results, and updated knowledge, arising from previous observations. This topic has been considered in several recent papers from a qif perspective. In [8] adaptive adversaries are analyzed, however, no cost structure is considered. More general models are in Mardziel et al.'s [23] and [24] . The model in [23] generalizes the classical model in several respects, in particular the defender is allowed to dynamically replace the current secret with a new one, and can adaptively submit inputs to the system, based on feedback from past outputs. [24] enriches this model one step further, by neatly distinguishing the defender loss from the adversary's gain when quantifying leakage. This is relevant when both the defender and the attacker incur some cost. The resulting model is also experimentally validated on a simple example. Although fairly general, the model in [24] is fundamentally different from ours: first, as already discussed, there is no implication of sequentiality in our model; second, and most important, in [24] the attacker incurs a cost upon observation, while, as explained in Section 3, in our case a cost are incurred upon performing an action, that is, upon testing a set of guesses, either known a priori or prompted by an observation.
In its lack of sequentiality, our cost model is similar to the capped-guesses password attack scenario considered by Khouzani et al. in [22] . Assuming that both the defender and the attacker incur some cost when, respectively, picking and guessing a secret, the goal there is to characterize optimal password picking policies for the defender, in the presence of an attacker capable of strategic reasoning. Such policies are characterized via (Nash, maxmin, Stackelberg) equilibria in a game-theoretic setting. The capped-guesses scenario corresponds precisely to the case of an attacker who incurs a cost that depends on the size of his pre-identified list of possible guesses. The attacks are basically brute-force: there is no notion of a posteriori gain, and of consequent advantage/leakage imputable to the functioning of the system. In this respect, the goal of [22] is fundamentally different from ours. Another scenario considered in [22] is costly-guesses, where the cost structure implies a sequential search. Attacker's interaction with the system amounts to submitting guesses from a pre-identified list, stopping a soon as a correct guess is made: again, there is no notion of advantage/leakage imputable to observation of the system.
Our results on capacity are related to the recent [2] by Alvim et al. The authors cover several scenarios of capacity for g-vulnerabilities, providing results for additive and multiplicative capacities when universal quantification is allowed over gain functions, over priors, or over both. While the general problem of calculating capacity over all priors for a fixed gain-function remains open, our Proposition 4 can be framed just as the solution of a particular instance of this problem.
The value of information has been studied in Economics: Marschak noted already in the 1950's that one must neatly distinguish between the amount of information of a source, that can be measured via Shannon entropy, and its value. Cases illustrating this distinction quite sharply can be found in [25] . Marschak's concern was ultimately centered on comparing different information sources (probability distributions, in our terminology), according to the value of information they provide when observed through different channels.
Appendix A. Proofs Lemma A1 (Lemma 1). G(p), as a function of p, is convex over P.
Proof. Let p, q ∈ P, λ ∈ [0, 1] and r = λp + (1 − λ)q be a convex combination of p and q. By definition of G(r) and of Bayes action we have the following. 
Proof. First note that p X can be expressed as a convex combination of the p(·| y), thus: p X (·) = y p Y (y)p(·|y), where as usual y runs over elements of positive probability. Since G is convex by the previous lemma, by Jensen's inequality we get 
By averaging the above inequalities on all y of positive probability, and exploiting the following lower bound on p( y) 
Proof. The first case is obvious because, under the given distribution, G( X) We consider now case 2, and hence assume α ≥ N. In what follows, we shall assume without loss of generality that the (prior or posterior) Bayes actions that will be considered include all elements whose probability is ≥ 1/α. Note that the prior Bayes action w * cannot be empty, as there must be at least one element x whose probability is ≥ 1/N ≥ 1/α. We first note that, given any prior distribution, taking into account that p ( Fix now any maximizing distribution: later on we will prove that one actually exists. We prove the existence of the desired maximizing distribution by the following successive claims:
1. There is a maximizing distribution for advantage such that p(c i ) = p(w i ) for i = 1, . . . , K . To see this, choose, if they exist, i ∈ {1, . . . , K } and x ∈ c i \ w i such that p(x) = δ, with 0 < δ < p(c i )/α. Note that w i cannot be empty, so choose any x ∈ w i . We claim that by moving the probability mass δ from x to x , the resulting distribution is not worse off than the original one, in terms of advantage. In fact, taking Lemma A2 into account, one checks that an increment is obtained that can be decomposed, with reference to the terms on the right-hand side of (A. 2. There is a maximizing distribution for advantage such that, within each class c i , the probability mass is distributed evenly among elements of w i . Start with a distribution satisfying the property in item 1, and redistribute in a uniform way the probability mass over w i , within each class. The resulting distribution is not worse off than the original one: this is proven with an analysis based on balancing increments and decrements in the terms of (A.2). One must distinguish the cases when r elements of w i exit the new w * or when r elements of w i enter the new w * , for some r ≥ 0. In the first case, the global increment is at least αrγ − r for some γ < 1/α, which is nonnegative. The second case is analyzed similarly. 
